Kant V Marx [round 1]

Immanuel Kant, from;

'A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON'.


OUR knowledge is derived from two fundamental sources of the consciousness.

The first is the faculty of receptivity of impressions; the second, the faculty of cognition of an object by means of these impressions or representations, this second power being sometimes styled spontaneity of concepts.

By the first, an object is given to us; by the second it is thought of in the mind.

Thus intuition and concepts constitute the elements of our entire knowledge, for neither intuition without concepts, nor concepts without intuition can yield any knowledge whatever.

Hence arise two branches of science, 'aesthetic' and logic, the former being the science of the rules of sensibility; the latter, the science of the rules of understanding.

Logic can be treated in two directions; either as logic of the general use of the understanding, or of some particular use of it.

The former includes the rules of thought, without which there can be no use of the understanding; but it has no regard to the objects to which the understanding is applied.

This is elementary logic.

But logic of the understanding in some particular use includes rules of correct thought in relation to special classes of objects; and this latter logic is generally taught in schools as preliminary to the study of sciences.

Thus, general logic takes no account of any of the contents of knowledge, but is limited simply to the consideration of the forms of thought.

But we are constrained by anticipation to form an idea of a logical science which has to deal not only with pure thought, but also has to determine the origin, validity and extent of the knowledge to which intuitions relate, and this might be styled transcendental logic.

In 'transcendental aesthetic' we isolated the faculty of sensibility. So in transcendental logic we isolate the understanding, concentrating our consideration on that element of thought which has its source simply in the understanding.

But transcendental logic must be divided into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. The former is a logic of truth, and is intended to furnish a canon of criticism.

When logic is used to judge not analytically, but to judge synthetically of objects in general, it is called transcendental dialectic, which serves as a protection against sophistical fallacy.
 

Analytic of Pure Concepts

The understanding may be defined as the faculty of judging. The function of thought in a judgement can come under four heads, each with three subdivisions.

1 Quantity of judgements:
Universal, particular, singular.

2 Quality Affirmative, negative, infinite.

3 Relation Categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive.

4 Modality
Problematical, assertory, apodictic (above contradiction).

If we examine each of these forms of judgement we discover that in every one is involved some peculiar idea which is its essential characteristic.

Thus, a singular judgement, in which the subject of discourse is a single object, involves obviously the special idea of oneness, or unity.

A particular judgement, relating to several objects, implies the idea of plurality, and discriminates between the several objects.

Now the whole list of these ideas will constitute the complete classification of the fundamental conceptions of the understanding, regarded as the faculty which judges, and these may be called categories.

[http://www.btinternet.com/~glynhughes/squashed/kant.htm]



MARX,[THERE ARE MORE THAN ONE!]



JULIUS[GROUCHO] MARX;

A child of five would understand this. Send someone to fetch a child of five.

KANT;

In Kant's view Pure Reason teaches that human knowledge is based on experience; but Practical Reason recognizes that there are a priori in the mind certain notions independent of experience and postulating the ideas of human liberty, God and immortality.

So, while distinguishing the provinces of materialism and idealism, he attempted to find a bond of union between them.

Published in 1788, the Critique of Practical Reason forms the central focus of Kant's thinking. It stands midway between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgement. Here Kant figures as a vindicator of the truth of Christianity, approaching his proof by first establishing positive affirmations of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God.

It includes an argument concerning the summum bonum of life, the special aim being to demonstrate that man should not simply seek to be happy, but should, by absolute obedience to the moral law, seek to become worthy of that happiness which God can bestow.

MARX[J]

From the moment I picked your book up until I laid it down, I was convulsed with laughter. Someday I intend reading it.

KANT;

Are space and time actual entities? Or are they only relations of things?

Space is simply the form of all the phenomena of external senses; that is, it is the subjective condition of the sensibility under which alone external intuition is possible.

Thus the form of all phenomena may exist a priori in the soul as a pure intuition previous to all experience. So we can only speak of space and of extended objects from the standpoint of human reason.

But when we have abstracted all the forms perceived by our sensibility, there remains a pure intuition which we call space. Therefore our discussion teaches us the objective validity of space with regard to all that can appear 

before us externally as an object; but equally the subjective ideality of space with regard to things if they are considered in themselves by our reason, that is, without taking into account the nature of our sensibility.

Time is not empirically conceived of; that is, it is not experimentally apprehended. Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions are dependent, and the representation of time to the mind is thus given a priori. In it alone can phenomena be apprehended. These may vanish, but time cannot be put aside.

Time is not something existing by itself independently, but is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena. If we deduct our own peculiar sensibility, then the idea of time disappears indeed, because it is not inherent in any object, but only in the subject which perceives that object. Space and time are essential a priori ideas, and they are the necessary conditions of all particular perceptions. From the latter and their objects we can, in imagination without exception, abstract; from the former we cannot.

Space and time are therefore to be regarded as the necessary a priori pre- conditions of the possibility and reality of all phenomena. It is clear that 'transcendental aesthetic' can obtain only these two elements, space and time, because all other concepts belong to the senses and pre-suppose experience, and so imply something empirical. For example, the concept of motion pre-supposes something moving, but in space regarded alone there is nothing that moves; therefore, whatever moves must be recognized by experience, and is a purely empirical datum.

MARX[J]

I, not events, have the power to make me happy or unhappy today. I can choose which it shall be. Yesterday is dead, tomorrow hasn't arrived yet. I have just one day, today, and I'm going to be happy in it.



So! another day......another debate!

The judges today are,

Mr S.Martin [USA]

Ms O Winfrey [USA]

The Death-God Wotan[Sweden]

Mr H.Hill [GB] 

Mr M T Tsung [China]

Mr C Dundee [Australia]

Want to be a Judge? Adopt a 'Personna', from above list, and post comments.....[you can remain anonymous if you prefer]

Is Kant correct? or will Marx win the day?
Karl Marx is now 'tagging' Julian,..they have exchanged places in the debate, in round 2, we will explore the dialectic monetarism of Karl,with regard to  causality, and actuality, also we will see if there is any reason for Karl's preposterous beard....