Albert Einstein on Compassion

"A human being is a part of the whole, called by us "Universe", a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest — a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and a foundation for inner security."

Letter of 1950, as quoted in The New York Times (29 March 1972) and The New York Post (28 November 1972)

Arthur Schopenhauer

Short Dialogue on the Indestructibility of Our True Being by Death.

Thrasymachos. Tell me briefly, what shall I be after my death? Be clear and precise.
Philalethes. Everything and nothing.
Thras. That is what I expected. You solve the problem by a contradiction. That trick is played out.
Phil. To answer transcendental questions in language that is made for immanent knowledge must assuredly lead to a contradiction.
Thras. What do you call transcendental knowledge, and what immanent? It is true these expressions are known to me, for my professor used them, but only as predicates of God, and as his philosophy had exclusively to do with God, their use was quite appropriate. For instance, if God was in the world, He was immanent; if He was somewhere outside it, He was transcendent. That is clear and comprehensible. One knows how things stand. But your old-fashioned Kantian doctrine is no longer understood. There has been quite a succession of great men in the metropolis of German learning ——
Phil. (aside). German philosophical nonsense!
Thras. —— such as the eminent Schleiermacher and that gigantic mind Hegel; and to-day we have left all that sort of thing behind, or rather we are so far ahead of it that it is out of date and known no more. Therefore, what good is it?
Phil. Transcendental knowledge is that which, going beyond the boundary of possible experience, endeavours to determine the nature of things as they are in themselves; while immanent knowledge keeps itself within the boundary of possible experience, therefore it can only apply to phenomena. As an individual, with your death there will be an end of you. But your individuality is not your true and final being, indeed it is rather the mere expression of it; it is not the thing-in-itself but only the phenomenon presented in the form of time, and accordingly has both a beginning and an end. Your being in itself, on the contrary, knows neither time, nor beginning, nor end, nor the limits of a given individuality; hence no individuality can be without it, but it is there in each and all. So that, in the first sense, after death you become nothing; in the second, you are and remain everything. That is why I said that after death you would be all and nothing. It is difficult to give you a more exact answer to your question than this and to be brief at the same time; but here we have undoubtedly another contradiction; this is because your life is in time and your immortality in eternity. Hence your immortality may be said to be something that is indestructible and yet has no endurance — which is again contradictory, you see. This is what happens when transcendental knowledge is brought within the boundary of immanent knowledge; in doing this some sort of violence is done to the latter, since it is used for things for which it was not intended.
Thras. Listen; without I retain my individuality I shall not give a sou for your immortality.
Phil. Perhaps you will allow me to explain further. Suppose I guarantee that you will retain your individuality, on condition, however, that you spend three months in absolute unconsciousness before you awaken.
Thras. I consent to that.
Phil. Well then, as we have no idea of time when in a perfectly unconscious state, it is all the same to us when we are dead whether three months or ten thousand years pass away in the world of consciousness. For in the one case, as in the other, we must accept on faith and trust what we are told when we awake. Accordingly it will be all the same to you whether your individuality is restored to you after the lapse of three months or ten thousand years.
Thras. At bottom, that cannot very well be denied.
Phil. But if, at the end of those ten thousand years, some one has quite forgotten to waken you, I imagine that you would have become accustomed to that long state of non-existence, following such a very short existence, and that the misfortune would not be very great. However, it is quite certain that you would know nothing about it. And again, it would fully console you to know that the mysterious power which gives life to your present phenomenon had never ceased for one moment during the ten thousand years to produce other phenomena of a like nature and to give them life.
Thras. Indeed! And so it is in this way that you fancy you can quietly, and without my knowing, cheat me of my individuality? But you cannot cozen me in this way. I have stipulated for the retaining of my individuality, and neither mysterious forces nor phenomena can console me for the loss of it. It is dear to me, and I shall not let it go.
Phil. That is to say, you regard your individuality as something so very delightful, excellent, perfect, and incomparable that there is nothing better than it; would you not exchange it for another, according to what is told us, that is better and more lasting?
Thras. Look here, be my individuality what it may, it is myself,

“For God is God, and I am I.”

I— I— I want to exist! That is what I care about, and not an existence which has to be reasoned out first in order to show that it is mine.
Phil. Look what you are doing! When you say, I— I— I want to exist you alone do not say this, but everything, absolutely everything, that has only a vestige of consciousness. Consequently this desire of yours is just that which is not individual but which is common to all without distinction. It does not proceed from individuality, but from existence in general; it is the essential in everything that exists, nay, it is that whereby anything has existence at all; accordingly it is concerned and satisfied only with existence in general and not with any definite individual existence; this is not its aim. It has the appearance of being so because it can attain consciousness only in an individual existence, and consequently looks as if it were entirely concerned with that. This is nothing but an illusion which has entangled the individual; but by reflection, it can be dissipated and we ourselves set free. It is only indirectly that the individual has this great longing for existence; it is the will to live in general that has this longing directly and really, a longing that is one and the same in everything. Since, then, existence itself is the free work of the will, nay, the mere reflection of it, existence cannot be apart from will, and the latter will be provisionally satisfied with existence in general, in so far, namely, as that which is eternally dissatisfied can be satisfied. The will is indifferent to individuality; it has nothing to do with it, although it appears to, because the individual is only directly conscious of will in himself. From this it is to be gathered that the individual carefully guards his own existence; moreover, if this were not so, the preservation of the species would not be assured. From all this it follows that individuality is not a state of perfection but of limitation; so that to be freed from it is not loss but rather gain. Don’t let this trouble you any further, it will, forsooth, appear to you both childish and extremely ridiculous when you completely and thoroughly recognise what you are, namely, that your own existence is the universal will to live.
Thras. You are childish yourself and extremely ridiculous, and so are all philosophers; and when a sedate man like myself lets himself in for a quarter of an hour’s talk with such fools, it is merely for the sake of amusement and to while away the time. I have more important matters to look to now; so, adieu!

from; 'Essays and Aphorisms,'
[ebookhttp://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/]

Spinoza

Some of Spinoza's philosophical positions are:

* The natural world is infinite.
* Good and evil are related to human pleasure and pain.
* Everything done by humans and other animals is excellent and divine.
* All rights are derived from the State.
* Animals can be used in any way by people for the benefit of the human race, according to a rational consideration of the benefit as well as the animal's status in nature.
[from Wapedia]

Spinoza's philosophy has much in common with Stoicism inasmuch as both philosophies sought to fulfill a therapeutic role by instructing people how to attain happiness (or eudaimonia, for the Stoics). However, Spinoza differed sharply from the Stoics in one important respect: he utterly rejected their contention that reason could defeat emotion. On the contrary, he contended, an emotion can only be displaced or overcome by a stronger emotion. For him, the crucial distinction was between active and passive emotions, the former being those that are rationally understood and the latter those that are not. He also held that knowledge of true causes of passive emotion can transform it to an active emotion, thus anticipating one of the key ideas of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis.

Though Spinoza was active in the Dutch Jewish community and extremely well-versed in Jewish texts, some claim that his controversial ideas eventually led community leaders to issue a cherem (Hebrew: חרם, a kind of excommunication) against him, effectively dismissing him from that Jewish society at age 23, though most of his friends were Marranos (secret Jews, or Sephardic Jews). Prior to any action by the Dutch Jewish community, however, his books were put on the Catholic Index of banned books, and were burned by Dutch Protestants, for their humanistic take on the Bible. Some historians argue that the Roman Catholic Church influenced the nascent Jewish community of Marranos to enact this rare excommunication law. Historian Adri Offenberg and others argue that the Amsterdam Jewish Community, at the time in its infancy and struggling to secure its position in the Dutch republic, was placed under aggressive external pressure by the Dutch Reform and Roman Catholic Churches to unwillingly quell what was perceived as heresy in dominant Christian circles (Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas).



But, the thing is, did he play ?   a Rationalist perhaps, but still a Human Being!






Glass eater Spinoza? should have remembered his Ethics! a world of 'Shards', indeed!

The World is Just A Great Big Onion

Onion Cure

In 1919 when the flu killed 40 million people, there was a Doctor who

visited many farmers to see if he could help them combat the flu. Many

of the farmers and their family had contracted it, and many died. The

doctor came upon one farmer, and to his surprise, everyone in the

household was very healthy. When the doctor asked what the farmer was

doing that was different, the wife replied that she had placed an

unpeeled onion in a dish in the rooms of the home (probably only two

rooms back then). The doctor couldn't believe it and asked if he could

have one of the onions and place it under the microscope. She gave him

one, and when he did this, he did find the flu virus in the onion. It

obviously absorbed the bacteria, therefore, keeping the family healthy.

Now, I heard this story from my hairdresser in AZ. She said that

several years ago many of her employees were coming down with the flu

and so were many of her customers. The next year she placed several

bowls with onions around in her shop. To her surprise, none of her

staff got sick. It must work... (And no, she is not in the onion

business.)

The moral of the story is, buy some onions and place them in bowls

around your home. If you work at a desk, place one or two in your

office or under your desk or even on top somewhere. Try it and see

what happens. We did it last year, and we never got the flu.

If this helps you and your loved ones from getting sick, all the

better. If you do get the flu, it just might be a mild case.

Whatever, what have you to lose? Just a few bucks on onions!!!

Now there is a P.S. to this, for I sent it to a friend in Oregon who

regularly contributes material to me on health issues. She replied

with this most interesting experience about onions: Thanks for the

reminder. I don't know about the farmer's story, but I do know that I

contracted pneumonia, and needless to say I was very ill. I came

across an article that said to cut both ends off an onion. Put one end

on a fork, and then place the forked end into an empty jar...placing

the jar next to the sick patient at night. It said the onion would be

black in the morning from the germs. Sure enough, it happened just

like that...the onion was a mess, and I began to feel better.

Another thing I read in the article was that onions and garlic placed

around the room saved many from the black plague years ago. They have

powerful antibacterial, antiseptic properties.

This is the other note: LEFTOVER ONIONS ARE POISONOUS! I have used an

onion which has been left in the fridge. Sometimes I don't use a whole

one at one time, so I save the other half for later. Now with this

info, I have changed my mind. I will buy smaller onions in the future.

I had the wonderful privilege of touring Mullins Food Products, makers

of mayonnaise. Mullins is huge, and is owned by 11 brothers and

sisters in the Mullins family. My friend, Jeanne, is the CEO.

Questions about food poisoning came up, and I wanted to share what I

learned from a chemist. The guy who gave us our tour is named Ed.

He's one of the brothers. Ed is a chemistry expert and is involved in

developing most of the sauce formula. He's even developed sauce

formula for McDonald's. Keep in mind that Ed is a food chemistry whiz.

During the tour, someone asked if we really needed to worry about

mayonnaise. People are always worried that mayonnaise will spoil.

Ed's answer will surprise you. Ed said that all commercially-made

mayo is completely safe. "It doesn't even have to be refrigerated. No

harm in refrigerating it, but it's not really necessary." He

explained that the pH in mayonnaise is set at a point that bacteria

could not survive in that environment. He then talked about the

quintessential picnic, with the bowl of potato salad sitting on the

table and how everyone blames the mayonnaise when someone gets sick.

Ed says that when food poisoning is reported, the first thing the

officials look for is when the 'victim' last ate ONIONS and where those

onions came from (in the potato salad?). Ed says it's not the

mayonnaise (as long as it's not homemade mayo) that spoils in the

outdoors. It's probably the onions, and if not the onions, it's the

POTATOES. He explained, onions are a huge magnet for bacteria,

especially uncooked onions. You should never plan to keep a portion of

a sliced onion. He says it's not even safe if you put it in a zip-lock

bag and put it in your refrigerator. It's already contaminated enough

just by being cut open and out for a bit, that it can be a danger to

you (and doubly watch out for those onions you put on your hotdogs at

the baseball park!)

Ed says if you take the leftover onion and cook it like crazy you'll

probably be okay, but if you slice that leftover onion and put it on

your sandwich, you're asking for trouble. Both the onions and the

moist potato in a potato salad will attract and grow bacteria faster

than any commercial mayonnaise will even begin to break down.

So, how's that for news? Take it for what you will. I (the author) am

going to be very careful about my onions from now on. For some reason,

I see a lot of credibility coming from a chemist and a company that

produces millions of pounds of mayonnaise every year.

Also, dogs should never eat onions. Their stomachs cannot metabolize

onions. Please remember it is dangerous to cut onions and try to use

it to cook the next day. It becomes highly poisonous for even a

single night and creates toxic bacteria which may cause adverse stomach

infections because of excess bile secretions and even food poisoning.

Please pass this on to all you love and care about.

Leibniz and Spinoza as Applied to Baseball




First we will consider the assigned baseball scenario under Leibniz’s system of metaphysics. In the baseball scenario, the aggregate of the player, bat, pitch, swing and all the other substances in the universe are one and all contingent. There are other possible things, to be sure; but there are also other possible universes that could have existed but did not. The totality of contingent things, the bat, the player, etc., themselves do not explain themselves. Here Leibniz involves the principle of reason; “there can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise.” There must be, Leibniz insists, something outside the totality of contingent things (baseball games) which explains them, something which is itself necessary and therefore requires no explanation other than itself.

This forms Leibniz’s proof for the existence of God; a version of Aquinas’s cosmological arguments. God, then, is the necessary being which constitutes the explanation of contingent being, why the universe is this way rather than any other. Not only is God the explanation of the baseball scenario but he is also the source of the intelligibility of such concepts as bat, swing and pitch. Leibniz goes further to prove the omniscience of God. If God is the explanation of the intelligibility of the universe, then God must have ‘access’ to that intelligibility, such that God could be said to know what it is that being allowed to exist---that is, God must have the ability to grasp complete concepts. Not only does God constitute the contingent baseball game but he also knows what will take place before it happens. The pitch, swing and hit all take place not because God creates them but because he allows them. There is only one constraint on what God allows to happen, it must not violate Leibniz’s other basic principle---non-contradiction. God could not allow it to happen that the batter hit the ball and the pitcher got a strike. God chooses the universe that is most perfect, therefore the hitter hitting the ball out of he park was the most perfect of all possibilities.

Leibniz uses the word ‘Monad’ to mean that which is one, has no parts and is therefore indivisible. These are the fundamental existing things. A monad contains within itself all the predicates that are true of the subject of which it is the concept, and these predicates are related by sufficient reason into a vast single network of explanation. So the monad must not only exhibit properties, but contain within itself ‘virtually’ or ‘potentially’ all the properties it will exhibit in the future, and also contain the ‘trace’ of all properties it did exhibit in the past. Take for example the ball in the baseball game scenario. The ball monad contains all the properties of the ball, roundness, hardness, whiteness, etc. It also contains a trace of the ball’s past, pop-ups, inside a glove and ground balls. In addition to this it contains the potential to be hit out, have the leather knocked off or be thrown away. All these properties are ‘folded- up within the Monad and they unfold when they have sufficient reason to do so (at the most perfect moment).

Not only does the Monad contain all of its own properties but it also contains all of it relational properties to all the other Monads in the universe. Each and every Monad is self-sufficient. They do not ‘need’ to be related to other Monads and neither are they influenced by other Monads. All of what appears to be cause and effect is a mere illusion. The relation of cause and effect is, according to Leibniz, merely a cognitive tool that human beings use to understand Monads and their relational properties. In the baseball scenario it appears that the hitter causes the ball to leave the park but in actuality he did not cause it per se. What really causes the ball to leave the park is the “pre-established harmony” On Leibniz’s view, every Monad is like a clock, behaving spontaneously in the way that it does, independently of other Monads, but nevertheless tied into the others through the common reason: God and his vast conception of the perfect universe. It was to be before the baseball game took place that the pitcher would leave a slider over the plate, that the hitter would make contact right on the label, and that the ball would soar out of the park.

Also, it is important to point out the number of Monads involved in the scenario. The bat, gloves, etc. are composed of an infinite number of Monads. We tend to refer to such things as a single Monad because they all act as one. However, the soul of the pitcher, batter, fans, and the rest of the players is only one monad which controls the composite of infinite body Monads.

All Monads possess an active power that originates from what is actual striving to finish or perfect their potential. This activity is not only a property of the soul Monad but also a property of all Monads. This inner activity of Monads must mean not only being the source of action, but also being affected and resisting. Change in a Monad is the intelligible, constantly and continuously unfolding being of a thing, from itself, to itself. The change seen in the baseball game is the unfolding of the Monads of the players and the numerous Monads of the material used to play the game.

Now for Spinoza’s metaphysical take on the baseball game scenario. Spinoza’s philosophy is based upon Pantheism. “Besides God,” says Spinoza, “no other substance can be conceived.” In other words, God is identical to the universe as a whole. Here is Spinoza’s argument for his Pantheism briefly:

1. There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same

2. God (substance containing infinite attributes) necessarily exists.

3. Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived.

Since no two substances can possess the same attribute and God contains all possible attributes, then no other substance can exist. In the baseball scenario everything, the ball, the pitcher, the batter, the fans, the grass, the stadium, everything, is an aspect of God. The only way to distinguish between two substances is by noting differences in their attributes or differences in their modes. A substance has its own identity before it is modified. Thus, the only properties which truly distinguish one substance from another are broad attributes, not narrow modes. Thus, if two universes have precisely the same attributes, then they are the same universe. The key to Spinoza’s argument for substances is that existence belongs to the nature of substance. Even if we can imagine scenarios in which there were not baseballs or baseball games, scenarios in which these things just stopped being, this does not mean that existence is not a part of a substance. Spinoza argues that we would not make this confusion if we kept in mind the difference between modes and substances. Modes, such as properties of baseball bats, do indeed come and go out of existence. We can conceive of non-existent modes, e.g. unicorns, but we cannot conceive of a non-existent substance.

If all things are part of God then it would seem that our baseball scenario would be a part of God, and that it would be part of ‘God’s’ body so to speak. However, Spinoza criticizes those who anthropomorphize the nature of God’s ‘body’. This is not possible says Spinoza because 1) God is infinite and 2) God is active while divided matter is passive. The two are incompatible.

Although everything in the universe is a part of God, God does not willfully direct the course of nature. First of all, Spinoza argues, there is no such thing as human free will. The pitcher did not will to throw the pitch and the hitter did not will to swing at the ball. Humans are ignorant of the true causes of thing and are only aware of our own desire to pursue what is useful to us. Given this tendency to see human behavior as willful and purposeful, we continue by imposing willful purposes on events outside of us. We conclude that God willingly guides external events for our benefit. The hitter believes that God caused the ball to be left out over the plate when this is simply not the case.

Spinoza continues that God does not act form a purpose and the concept of a perfect final goal is flawed. For Spinoza, the most perfect of God’s acts are those closest to him. Succeeding events further down the chain of perfection are increasingly less perfect. If the hitter’s swing is near to God then it is more perfect but if it is far from God then it is less perfect. Belief in final causes, that God meant the home run to be hit so that a certain team would win, compromises God’s perfection since it implies that he desires something which he lacks. For Spinoza, the theologian’s contention that God willfully directs all natural events amounts to a reduction to ignorance. The baseball game may be a part of God, but God did not cause it to happen in a certain way.

PLATO CRITICIZES HIS OWN THEORY OF FORMS, AND THEN ARGUES FOR THE FORMS NONETHELESS (PARMENIDES)
Socrates, he said, your eagerness for discussion is admirable. And now tell me. Have you yourself drawn this distinction you speak of and separated apart on the one side forms themselves and on the other the things that share in them? Do you believe that there is such a thing as likeness itself apart from the likeness that we possess, and so on with unity and plurality and all the terms in Zeno's argument that you have just been listening to?
Certainly I do, said Socrates.
And also in cases like these, asked Parmenides, is there, for example, a form of rightness or of beauty or of goodness, and of all such things?
Yes.
And again, a form of man, apart from ourselves and all other men like us--a form of man as something by itself? Or a form of fire or of water?
I have often been puzzled about those things, Parmenides, whether one should say that the same thing is true in their case or not.
Are you also puzzled, Socrates, about cases that might be thought absurd, such as hair or mud or dirt or any other trivial and undignified objects? Are you doubtful whether or not to assert that each of these has a separate form distinct from things like those we handle?
Not at all, said Socrates. In these cases, the things are just the things we see; it would surely be too absurd to suppose that they have a form. All the same, I have sometimes been troubled by a doubt whether what is true in one case may not be true in all. Then, when I have reached that point, I am driven to retreat, for fear of tumbling into a bottomless pit of nonsense. Anyhow, I get back to the things which we were just now speaking of as having forms, and occupy my time with thinking about them. That, replied Parmenides, is because you are still young, Socrates, and philosophy has not yet taken hold of you so firmly as I believe it will someday. You will not despise any of these objects then, but at present your youth makes you still pay attention to what the world will think. However that may be, tell me this. You say you hold that there exist certain forms, of which these other things come to partake and so to be called after their names; by coming to partake of likeness or largeness or beauty or justice, they become like or large or beautiful or just?
Certainly, said Socrates.
Then each thing that partakes receives as its share either the form as a whole or a part of it? Or can there be any other way of partaking besides this?
No, how could there be?
Do you hold, then, that the form as a whole, a single thing, is in each of the many, or how?
Why should it not be in each, Parmenides?
If so, a form which is one and the same will be at the same time, as a whole, in a number of things which are separate, and consequently will be separate from itself.
No, it would not, replied Socrates, if it were like one and the same day, which is in many places at the same time and nevertheless is not separate from itself. Suppose any given form is in them all at the same time as one and the same thing in that way.
I like the way you make out that one and the same thing is in many places at once, Socrates. You might as well spread a sail over a number of people and then say that the one sail as a whole was over them all. Don't you think that is a fair analogy?

Heisenburg

[from Wikipedia]

In quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states by precise inequalities that certain pairs of physical properties, such as position and momentum, cannot be simultaneously known to arbitrarily high precision. That is, the more precisely one property is measured, the less precisely the other can be measured. The principle states that a minimum exists for the product of the uncertainties in these properties that is equal to or greater than one half of the reduced Planck constant (ħ = h/2π).
Published by Werner Heisenberg in 1927, the principle means that it is impossible to determine simultaneously both the position and momentum of an electron or any other particle with any great degree of accuracy or certainty. Moreover, the principle is not a statement about the limitations of a researcher's ability to measure particular quantities of a system, but it is a statement about the nature of the system itself as described by the equations of quantum mechanics.
In quantum physics, a particle is described by a wave packet, which gives rise to this phenomenon. Consider the measurement of the position of a particle. It could be anywhere. The particle's wave packet has non-zero amplitude, meaning the position is uncertain – it could be almost anywhere along the wave packet. To obtain an accurate reading of position, this wave packet must be 'compressed' as much as possible, meaning it must be made up of increasing numbers of sine waves added together. The momentum of the particle is proportional to the wavenumber of one of these waves, but it could be any of them. So a more precise position measurement – by adding together more waves – means the momentum measurement becomes less precise (and vice versa).
The only kind of wave with a definite position is concentrated at one point, and such a wave has an indefinite wavelength (and therefore an indefinite momentum). Conversely, the only kind of wave with a definite wavelength is an infinite regular periodic oscillation over all space, which has no definite position. So in quantum mechanics, there can be no states that describe a particle with both a definite position and a definite momentum. The more precise the position, the less precise the momentum.
A mathematical statement of the principle is that every quantum state has the property that the root mean square (RMS) deviation of the position from its mean (the standard deviation of the x-distribution):

times the RMS deviation of the momentum from its mean (the standard deviation of p):

can never be smaller than a fixed fraction of Planck's constant:

The uncertainty principle can be restated in terms of other measurement processes, which involves collapse of the wavefunction. When the position is initially localized by preparation, the wavefunction collapses to a narrow bump in an interval Δx > 0, and the momentum wavefunction becomes spread out. The particle's momentum is left uncertain by an amount inversely proportional to the accuracy of the position measurement:

.

If the initial preparation in Δx is understood as an observation or disturbance of the particles then this means that the uncertainty principle is related to the observer effect. However, this is not true in the case of the measurement process corresponding to the former inequality but only for the latter inequality.

Thomas Kuhn

Kuhn expresses or builds on the idea that participants in different disciplinary matrices will see the world differently by claiming that their worlds are different:

In a sense I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One contains constrained bodies that fall slowly, the other pendulums that repeat their motions again and again. In one, solutions are compounds, in the other mixtures. One is embedded in a flat, the other in a curved, matrix of space. Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction (1962/1970a, 150).(19

Remarks such as these gave some commentators the impression that Kuhn was a strong kind of constructivist, holding that the way the world literally is, depends on accepted scientific theory. Kuhn, however, denied any constructivist import to his remarks on world-change.
The closest Kuhn came to constructivism was to acknowledge a parallel with Kantian idealism.
Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1989/1993), as a result of working with Kuhn, developed a neo-Kantian interpretation of his discussion of perception and world-change.
We may distinguish between the world-in-itself and the ‘world’ of our perceptual and related experiences (the phenomenal world). This corresponds to the Kantian distinction between the noumena and the phenomena.

The important difference between Kant and Kuhn is that Kuhn regards the general form of the phenomena not to be fixed but instead to be changeable.

A shift in paradigm can lead, via the theory-dependence of observation, to a difference in one's experiences of things and thus to a change in one's phenomenal world.

Kuhn likened the change in the phenomenal world to the Gestalt-switch that occurs when one sees the duck-rabbit diagram first as (similar to) a duck then as (similar to) a rabbit, although he himself acknowledged that he was not sure whether the Gestalt case was just an analogy or whether it illustrated some more general truth about the way the mind works that encompasses the scientific case too.


Quack Quack! hahaha!

Mu

Joshu (A.D. 778-897) was a famous Chinese Zen Master who lived in Joshu, the province from which he took his name. One day a troubled monk approached him, intending to ask the Master for guidance. A dog walked by. The monk asked Joshu, "Has that dog a Buddha-nature or not?" The monk had barely completed his question when Joshu shouted: "MU!"

The character for MU literally means "nothing." Joshu's answer was quite simply "Nothing," which was not to say that a dog lacks Buddha-nature. Naturally, both Joshu and the monk knew that Buddha-nature is inherent in all creatures without exception, which is why Joshu's "MU" should never be interpreted as a denial of this fact.

The only purpose of his response was to break the monk of rational thinking in trying to understand the truth of Zen and to get him to aspire to a higher understanding of reality beyond affirmation and negation, in which all contradictions disappear on their own. Joshu's "MU" is neither a yes nor a no. It is an answer that surpasses the opposition of yes and no and directly points to Buddha-nature, to the reality beyond yes and no.

Those who believe they can solve the koan MU through deductive reasoning will only spin their wheels and not gain an inch on MU. Clinging to words and expressions and attempting to interpret and understand MU intellectually is like trying to hit the moon with a stick, or trying to relieve an itch on your foot by scratching your shoe. The old masters said, "Attempting to solve MU by rational means is like attempting to break through an iron wall with your fist."